Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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Drew Fudenberg on Prisoner’s Dilemma - Dictionary of Arguments
Mause I 156f Prisoner's Dilemma/Commodity Allocation/Economy/Common goods/Fudenberg: rationally, each player (user of a general good) places his own interests in the foreground. (See Prisoner's Dilemma/Ostrom). As a result, all those involved find themselves in the worst collective situation of all-round overuse - the Pareto-inferior Nash equilibrium. Repetition/Fudenberg: In game theory, this does not change even if the users play their prisoner's dilemma (finally often) repeatedly: the defection of all inevitably leads to the pareto inferiority of the game result. Only in the theoretical extreme case of an infinite repetition of always the same game predicts the theoretical folk theorem (e.g. Fudenberg and Maskin 1986) (1) that mutual cooperation can also be of equal importance. 1. D. Fudenberg, E. Maskin, The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information. Econometrica 54, (3) 1986, p. 533– 554._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
EconFud I Drew Fudenberg Eric Maskin The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information 1986 Mause I Karsten Mause Christian Müller Klaus Schubert, Politik und Wirtschaft: Ein integratives Kompendium Wiesbaden 2018 |
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> Counter arguments against Fudenberg
> Counter arguments in relation to Prisoner’s Dilemma
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-28